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Abstract	
We	 propose	 a	 distinction	 between	 inclusionary	 and	 exclusionary	 autocratic	 ruling	
strategies	 and	 develop	 novel	 theoretical	 propositions	 on	 the	 legacy	 that	 these	
strategies	 leave	 on	 citizens’	 political	 attitudes	 once	 the	 autocratic	 regime	 broke	
down.	 Using	 data	 of	 1.3	 million	 survey	 respondents	 from	 70	 countries	 and	
Hierarchical	 Age-Period-Cohort	 models	 we	 estimate	 between	 and	 within	 cohort	
differences	in	citizens’	democratic	support.	We	find	that	inclusionary	regimes	–	with	
wider	redistribution	of	socio-economic	and	political	benefits	–	leave	a	stronger	anti-
democratic	 legacy	 than	 exclusionary	 regimes	 on	 the	 political	 attitudes	 of	 their	
citizens.	Similarly,	citizens	who	were	part	of	 the	winning	group	 in	an	autocracy	are	
more	critical	with	democracy	compared	to	citizens	who	were	part	of	discriminated	
groups.	This	article	 contributes	 to	our	understanding	about	how	autocracies	affect	
the	hearts	and	minds	of	ordinary	citizens.	
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Introduction	
February	5,	2018	marked	the	day	on	which	the	Berlin	Wall	stood	as	long	as	it	is	gone	
-	28	years	and	3	months.	Yet,	the	legacy	of	the	former	German	Democratic	Republic	
(GDR)	 is	 still	 tangible.	 The	 autocratic	 rule	 of	 the	 GDR	 has	 left	 an	 imprint	 on	 the	
political	attitudes	of	its	citizens	that	did	not	cease	to	exist	with	the	Fall	of	the	Berlin	
Wall,	making	many	nostalgic	 about	 the	 autocratic	 past.	 Some	have	 connected	 this	
so-called	 “Ostalgie”	 to	 anti-democratic	 resentment,	 which	 is	 widespread	 in	 East	
Germany.	 The	 former	 GDR	 is	 not	 an	 exception.	 Anti-democratic	 political	 attitudes	
last	usually	longer	than	the	autocratic	regime	in	which	they	developed.	Yet,	the	GDR	
represents	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 autocracy	 that	 placed	 heavy	 emphasis	 on	 equal	
education,	 a	 comprehensive	 health	 system,	 and	 a	 wide	 distribution	 of	 socio-
economic	 benefits	 among	 the	working	 class.	 Other	 regimes	 are	 less	 generous	 -	 in	
economic	and	political	terms	-	towards	their	citizens.	
Against	this	backdrop,	our	article	is	motivated	by	the	question	to	what	extent	
ruling	 strategies	 of	 autocratic	 regimes	 influence	 the	 political	 attitudes	 of	 their	
citizens,	 even	 after	 these	 authoritarian	 regimes	 broke	 down.	 In	 particular,	 our	
research	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 mechanism	 of	 authoritarian	 nostalgia	 and	 anti-
democratic	sentiments	that	are	a	product	of	authoritarian	socialization.	To	achieve	
this,	 we	 bring	 two	 strands	 of	 research	 into	 a	 dialogue.	 While	 the	 comparative	
authoritarianism	 literature	 has	 focused	 mainly	 on	 the	 inner	 workings	 of	 non-
democratic	 rule	 (Gandhi,	 2008;	 Svolik,	 2012),	 it	 paid	 less	 attention	 to	 the	 role	 of	
ordinary	 citizens.	 However,	 this	 is	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 the	 second	 strand	 of	
literature,	the	legacy	literature,	which	is	mainly	interested	in	the	effect	that	previous	
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non-democratic	 rule	 has	 on	 political	 beliefs	 and	 attitudes	 –	 once	 democracy	 is	
installed	 (Bernhard	 and	 Karakoc	 2007;	 Neundorf,	 2010;	 Pop-Eleches	 and	 Tucker,	
2017).	 Yet,	 it	 is	 surprising	 that	 the	 legacy	 literature	 remains	 rather	mute	 towards	
addressing	the	effect	of	variation	in	autocratic	ruling	strategies	on	political	attitudes.		
Theoretically,	 we	 rely	 on	 political	 socialization	 theory	 and	 argue	 that	 the	
political	environment	and	 the	 ruling	strategy	 that	 someone	experiences	during	 the	
so-called	 “formative	 years”	 not	 only	 impact	 on	 a	 citizen’s	 contemporary	 political	
attitudes,	 but	 also	 leaves	 a	 lasting	 imprint	 on	 her	 political	 attitudes	 in	 later	 life	
(Mannheim,	1928;	Krosnick	and	Alwin,	1989;	Sears	and	Funk,	1999).	In	other	words,	
the	socio-political	experience	as	a	young	adult	coins	how	one	assesses	politics	later	
in	 life.	 More	 concretely,	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 the	 legacy	 effect	 that	 different	
authoritarian	ruling	strategies	have	on	the	political	attitudes	of	citizens,	in	particular	
towards	democracy.	Focusing	on	the	legacy	here	further	allows	us	to	infer	about	the	
public	support	created	by	these	various	ruling	strategies	during	the	dictatorship.		
We	propose	a	 typological	distinction	between	 inclusionary	and	exclusionary	
strategies.	 Building	 upon	 Bueno	 de	 Mesquita	 et	 al.’s	 work	 (2003),	 we	 distinguish	
between	political	and	economic	dimensions	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	in	autocracies.	
We	 argue	 that	 inclusionary	 autocracies	 tend	 to	 redistribute	more	 of	 their	 political	
and	 economic	 resources	 towards	 their	 citizens	 in	 order	 to	 create	 a	 broad	 public	
support	 base.	 In	 contrast,	 exclusionary	 autocracies	 follow	 the	 opposite	 route	 and	
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channel	political	influence	and	economic	benefits	to	a	small	group	of	privileged	(and	
therefore	loyal)	individuals	who	help	the	leader	survive	in	power.2		
	 We	 show	 that	 these	 two	 different	 regime	 strategies	 of	 inclusion	 and	
exclusion	affect	the	long-term	political	attitudes	of	ordinary	citizens.	To	demonstrate	
the	heterogeneity	of	the	legacy	effect	and	to	arrive	at	a	nuanced	empirical	picture,	
we	 test	 our	 theoretical	 argument	 with	 two	 complementary	 empirical	 strategies.	
First,	 we	 examine	 differences	 in	 political	 attitudes	 of	 citizens	who	were	 socialized	
under	different	autocratic	ruling	strategies	on	the	one	hand,	and	who	were	brought	
up	under	democracy	on	the	other	hand	(between-regime	comparison).	Second,	we	
further	 examine	 differences	 in	 political	 attitudes	 between	 individuals	 who	 were	
socialized	 under	 the	 same	 autocratic	 regime,	 yet	 had	 different	 socio-political	
statuses,	 i.e.	belonging	 to	an	 included	group	 that	profits	 from	the	 regime	or	being	
particularly	 discriminated	 against	 and	 excluded	 from	 power	 (within-regime	
comparison).		 	
	 The	 empirical	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	 a	 newly	 created,	 harmonized	 public	
opinion	dataset	 that	 combines	1,070	 (country	x	wave	x	 study)3	existing	 surveys	 for	
70	 countries	 from	 around	 the	 world	 and	 data	 on	 authoritarian	 regimes’	 ruling	
strategies	from	the	Varieties	of	Democracy	(V-Dem)	dataset	(Coppedge	et	al.,	2016).	
																																								 																				
2	 This	 conceptualization	 does	 not	 exclude	 repression,	 nor	 are	 we	 oblivious	 to	 violence	 being	 an	
inherent	 feature	 of	 authoritarian	 politics	 (Svolik,	 2012).	 Rather,	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 provision	 of	
public	goods,	while	holding	repression	constant,	we	simplify	the	focus	of	our	theoretical	argument.		
Thereby	 we	 are	 better	 able	 to	 disentangle	 the	 long-term	 effect	 of	 certain	 policies	 on	 citizens.	
Importantly,	repression	and	 inclusiveness	seem	be	distinct	strategies.	Using	data	from	Varieties	of	
Democracy	(V-Dem;	more	details	below)	shows	that	the	correlation	between	providing	public	goods	
and	hard	repression	is	only	R=0.37	in	autocracies.	Hard	repression	correlates	also	only	moderately	
with	providing	more	access	to	political	power	in	autocracies	(R=0.34).			
3	 The	 data	 is	 based	 on	 ten	 different	 cross-national	 studies	 such	 as	 the	World	 Value	 Survey	 or	 the	
Latinobarometer	that	all	have	been	collected	in	several	waves	at	different	points	of	time.	
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We	 use	 hierarchical	 age,	 period,	 cohort	 (HAPC)	 models	 to	 estimate	 the	 effect	 of	
these	strategies	on	citizens’	attitudes	towards	democracy	today.		
We	 find	 that	 people	who	were	 socialized	 in	 exclusionary	 regimes	 are	more	
supportive	of	democracy	compared	to	citizens	from	more	inclusionary	regimes,	and	
even	democracies.	As	 the	policies	of	autocratic	 regimes	become	more	 inclusionary	
this	 finding	 is	 reversed.	 Citizens	 from	 inclusionary	 regimes	 are	 less	 satisfied	 with	
democracy	 compared	 to	 citizens	 from	 exclusionary	 regimes	 and	 democracies.	We	
also	 find	 a	mutual	 reinforcement	 effect	 between	 political	 and	 economic	 inclusion.	
This	 means	 that	 if	 an	 authoritarian	 regime	 is	 economically	 inclusive	 by	 providing	
public	 goods	 to	 its	 citizens,	 being	 politically	 inclusive	 and	 incorporating	 a	 broad	
variety	 of	 societal	 groups	 into	 political	 power,	 significantly	 decreases	 later	
democratic	 support.	 The	 within-regime	 analysis	 further	 supports	 our	 theoretical	
expectation	that	authoritarian	ruling	strategies	matter	for	the	formation	of	citizens’	
political	attitudes.		
This	research	contributes	to	existing	literature	in	three	crucial	ways.	First,	we	
propose	 a	 new	 typological	 distinction	 between	 inclusionary	 and	 exclusionary	
autocracies.	By	so	doing,	we	focuses	on	the	role	of	ordinary	citizens	under	autocratic	
rule.	 Second,	we	are	 able	 to	 increase	 considerably	 the	 scope	of	 former	 studies	on	
authoritarian	nostalgia	that	have	mainly	concentrated	on	post-Communist	regimes.	
It	 is	 the	 first	 global	 analysis	 that	 includes	 70	 countries.	 Third,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 test	
rigorously	 the	 legacy	 effect	 that	 different	 autocratic	 ruling	 strategies	 have	 on	
citizens’	 political	 attitudes.	 As	 such,	 our	 research	 has	 important	 implications	 for	
understanding	 the	 development	 of	 democratic	 dissatisfaction	 and	 anti-democratic	
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resentments	that	might	be	already	anchored	in	the	minds	of	the	people	even	before	
democracy	has	been	installed.		
Inclusionary	and	exclusionary	authoritarian	regimes		
We	argue	that	dictators	fall	on	a	continuum	between	two	types	of	ruling	strategies:	
inclusionary	 and	 exclusionary.	 Our	 conception	 of	 inclusionary	 and	 exclusionary	
autocracy	 goes	 beyond	 the	 recent	 institutional	 focus	 in	 comparative	
authoritarianism.	 Instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 the	 institutional	 and	 elite	 power	
architecture	 (Geddes,	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Hadenius	 and	 Teorell	 2007)	 and	 the	 effect	 of	
formal	and	informal	institutions	in	autocratic	settings	(Gandhi	2008;	Magaloni	2008;	
Schedler	2013;	Svolik	2012),	we	focus	on	examining	the	effect	on	ordinary	citizens	of	
inclusion	and	exclusion	from	political	power	and	economic	benefits.4	
We	define	an	 inclusionary	 regime	as	 a	 regime	 that	 relies	on	a	broad	public	
support	 base.5	 These	 regimes	 incorporate	 various	 social,	 economic	 and	 ethnic	
groups	into	their	power	structure	by	ensuring	a	wider	redistribution	of	political	and	
socio-economic	 benefits	 to	 the	 population.	 This	 strategy	 aims	 at	 minimizing	 the	
threats	that	can	emanate	from	within	the	society	by	buying	off	the	opposition	with	
political	and	economic	concessions	that	are	available	only	if	they	support	the	regime.		
																																								 																				
4	Please	 refer	also	 to	Appendix	7	 in	which	we	plot	 the	distribution	of	 inclusionary	and	exclusionary	
strategies	by	the	three	main	regime	types	(one-party,	military,	personalist	regimes)	of	Geddes	et	al.	
(2014).		
5	We	do	not	aim	to	explore	the	reasons	why	some	dictators	are	more	 inclusive	than	others,	or	why	
they	 need	 a	 broader	 ruling	 coalition	 to	 stay	 in	 power.	 Rather,	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 providing	 a	
comprehensive	typological	distinction	of	authoritarian	ruling	strategies.	
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In	 contrast,	 we	 define	 an	 exclusionary	 regime	 as	 a	 regime	 with	 a	 narrow	
societal	basis	that	excludes	from	power	most	social,	religious,	and	ethnic	groups.	Its	
power	stems	from	a	narrow	set	of	actors	that	obtain	exclusive	benefits.	Exclusionary	
regimes	 rely	 more	 on	 redistributing	 particularistic	 goods	 to	 the	 members	 of	 the	
ruling	 elite,	 while	 actively	 restricting	 the	 access	 to	 power	 and	 economic	
redistribution	to	other	groups	from	within	society.6		
This	 conceptualization	 of	 autocratic	 ruling	 strategies	 borrows	 conceptually	
from	Bueno	de	Mesquita	 et	 al.	 (2003)	 selectorate	 theory.	 The	 selectorate	benefits	
from	 the	 redistributive	 policies	 of	 the	 regime	 as	 it	 provides	 the	 regime	 with	 the	
necessary	 support	 to	 extend	 its	 survival.	 However,	 since	 not	 all	 members	 of	 the	
selectorate	 can	 participate	 in	 autocratic	 governance,	 autocrats	 rely	 on	 an	 inner	
sanctum	 of	 elites,	 the	 winning	 coalition,	 that	 endows	 the	 autocrat	 with	 sufficient	
power	 to	 remain	 in	 power	 (Svolik	 2012;	 Geddes	 et	 al.	 2014).	 Members	 of	 the	
selectorate	that	provide	valuable	service,	and	develop	a	network	of	support	within	
their	 local	organizations	and	communities	can	climb	the	political	 ladder	and	obtain	
positions	in	the	winning	coalition.	Previous	research	in	comparative	authoritarianism	
has	concentrated	on	the	role	of	this	winning	coalition,	but	has	under-theorized	the	
																																								 																				
6	 It	 could	 be	 reasonably	 assumed	 that,	 in	 result,	 inclusionary	 autocracies	 are	 more	 equal	 than	
exclusionary	 autocracies.	 Yet,	 it	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 article	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 ongoing	
nuanced	discussion	about	the	effect	of	inequality	and	redistributive	policies	as	drivers	or	hindrance	
to	 democratization.	While	 Boix	 (2003)	 argued	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 negative	 linear	 relationship	 between	
inequality	and	the	probability	to	democratize,	Acemoglu	and	Robinson	(2006)	proposed	an	inverted	
U-shape.	In	turn,	Haggard	and	Kaufmann	(2016)	recently	cautioned	that	we	should	not	overestimate	
distributive	 conflicts	 as	 a	 driver	 for	 democratization.	 Moreover,	 Ansell	 and	 Samuels	 (2014:	 2)	
challenged	the	“redistributivist	thesis”	and	focused	on	elite	competition	instead,	arguing	that	when	
rising	 disenfranchised	 groups	 accumulate	 income,	 this	 results	 in	 higher	 income	 inequality	 which	
again	 leads	to	growing	demands	for	regime	change	as	these	new	economic	groups	want	to	 insure	
their	status	against	autocratic	arbitrariness.		
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effect	 of	 the	 governing	 strategies	 autocrats	 use	 to	 ensure	 the	 loyalty	 of	 its	
selectorate.		
We	use	the	selectorate	theory	as	an	important	theoretical	springboard.7	We	
build	upon	it	and	derive	two	separate	dimensions.	We	distinguish	explicitly	between	
(1)	political	and	(2)	socio-economic	inclusion	and	exclusion	strategies.	When	it	comes	
to	the	political	 inclusion,	we	argue	that	dictators	regulate	access	to	political	power	
by	 making	 use	 of	 decisive	 “qualities”	 such	 as	 ethnic	 origin,	 religious	 belief,	
organizational,	 and/or	 class	 membership	 (e.g.	 military	 generals,	 workers	 in	
Communist	 regimes).	 The	 dictator	 serves	 as	 the	 gate-keeper	 that	 decides	 on	 the	
basis	of	these	specific	attributes	whom	to	include	in	power.	The	dictator	can	adopt	a	
more	 inclusive	 ruling	 strategy	 by	widening	his	 support	 base	 and	 incorporate	more	
societal	 groups	 in	 power,	 or	 he	 can	 restrict	 it	 to	 a	 very	 few,	 hand-picked	 people	
whose	support	is	necessary	and	sufficient	to	ensure	autocratic	survival.	
Similarly,	 granting	 and	withholding	 socio-economic	benefits	 can	be	used	by	
autocrats	to	ensure	the	loyalty	of	the	selectorate	and	winning	coalition.	Like	access	
to	power,	this	dimension	can	be	narrowed	down	to	very	few	or	can	be	spread	more	
equally	among	citizens.	In	other	words,	the	co-optation	efforts	take	place	either	on	a	
restricted	 elite	 level	 and	 target	 strategically	 important	 business	 and	 military	
personnel,	or	it	can	reach	to	the	masses	by	gaining	specific	support	among	the	wider	
population	 (Kim	 and	Gandhi,	 2010).	 As	 such,	 economic	 strategies	 of	 inclusion	 and	
																																								 																				
7	We	see	three	major	dimensions	in	which	we	deviate	from	the	original	selectorate	theory.	First,	we	
differ	in	the	explanatory	aim.	We	are	not	interested	in	explaining	regime	survival,	but	are	interested	
in	 the	 long-term	 effects	 of	 different	 ruling	 strategies	 on	 political	 attitudes.	 Second,	 we	 do	 not	
develop	a	universal	theory	that	holds	across	democratic	and	autocratic	regimes,	but	focus	only	on	
the	 autocratic	 pole.	 Third,	 in	 our	 conceptualization	we	 introduce	 the	 explicit	 distinction	 between	
economic	and	political	inclusion/exclusion	instruments.		
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exclusion	range	from	the	provision	of	public	goods	that	do	not	discriminate	against	
any	 social	 groups	 to	 a	 particularistic	 approach	 of	 distributing	material	 benefits	 to	
very	few.8	
	
Regime	Type	and	Their	Effect	on	Ordinary	Citizens	
From	these	 two	opposing	 ruling	strategies,	we	can	now	formulate	expectations	on	
how	 inclusionary	 and	 exclusionary	 regimes	 affect	 their	 citizens’	 political	 attitudes.	
Inclusionary	 regimes	 try	 to	 win	 the	 hearts	 and	 minds	 of	 their	 people,	 while	
exclusionary	 regimes’	 survival	 hinges	 on	 the	 loyalty	 of	 very	 few	 elite	 members.	
Inclusionary	 autocracies	 act	 through	 a	 wide	 redistribution	 of	 socio-economic	
resources	 and	 political	 power	 and	 build	 a	 dense	 network	 of	 support	 in	 society.	
Furthermore,	we	argue	that	inclusionary	regimes	are	proactive	in	instilling	a	climate	
of	 pro-regime	 support	 amongst	 its	 citizens,	 one	 in	 which	 the	 regime	 is	 seen	 as	
benevolent	for	offering	the	citizens	benefits	that	would	otherwise	be	inaccessible.	In	
exclusionary	regimes,	the	dictator	is	more	concerned	with	maintaining	the	loyalty	of	
its	 ruling	 elite,	 making	 sure	 that	 any	 member	 of	 the	 ruling	 coalition	 does	 not	
threaten	 his	 position	 in	 power.	 In	 result,	 exclusionary	 regimes	 dismiss	 ordinary	
citizens	from	influencing	politics	and	exclude	them	from	economic	redistribution.		
																																								 																				
8	 If	we	assume	 independent	dimensions,	 inclusionary	 regimes	are	 those	 that	 score	high	 in	 terms	of	
political	and	economic	inclusion.	Exclusionary	regimes,	in	contrast,	are	those	regimes	that	score	low	
in	 political	 and	 economic	 inclusion.	 As	 such,	 these	 two	 types	 are	 extreme	or	 ideal	 types.	We	 are	
aware	 that	 by	 cross-tabulating	 the	 two	 dimensions,	 “hybrid”	 regimes	 emerge	 that	 either	 score	
high/low	or	low/high	on	political	and	economic	inclusion.	In	Appendix	10,	we	provide	an	overview	
of	the	empirical	distribution	across	these	four	types	of	authoritarian	rule.	We	also	show	empirical	
evidence	for	the	respective	legacy	effect	of	all	four	types	of	authoritarian	rule	on	later	democratic	
satisfaction.	
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Political	socialization	and	the	making	of	generations	
We	 expect	 that	 citizens	 who	 are	 exposed	 to	 an	 inclusionary	 regime	 to	 be	 more	
supportive	 of	 the	 regime	 as	 these	 regimes	 actively	 try	 to	 develop	 a	 pro-regime	
sentiment	amongst	its	citizens	by	providing	them	with	benefits	in	exchange	for	their	
support	 for	 the	 regime.	Unfortunately,	we	 are	 usually	 not	 able	 to	 observe	 regime	
support	 during	 existing	 dictatorships,	 as	 representative	 and	 comparable	 public	
opinion	 research	 is	 almost	 impossible	 during	 authoritarian	 regimes	 (Kuran,	 1997).9	
Yet,	we	 argue	 here	 that	 this	 is	 not	 necessary.	 Instead,	we	use	 the	 theoretical	 and	
methodological	 approach	 of	 cohort	 analysis,	 which	 allows	 the	 identification	 of	
distinct	 characteristics	 of	 those	 generations	 that	 were	 socialized	 under	 different	
political	 regimes.	Generations	 thereby	 function	 like	 fossils	 that	 carry	evidence	of	 a	
long-gone	past.	Here,	we	assume	that	the	political	preferences	of	whole	generations	
that	 grew	 up	 under	 inclusionary	 or	 exclusionary	 regimes	 have	 been	 shaped	 and	
remain	 prevalent	 in	 the	 population,	 especially	 for	 those	 that	 experienced	 these	
regime	during	the	so-called	formative	years	during	adolescence.10		
These	expectations	build	on	the	theory	of	political	socialization,	which	argues	
that	 fundamental	 values	 are	 acquired	 largely	 in	 early	 adulthood.	 The	 theory	 goes	
back	 to	 the	 seminal	 work	 of	 Karl	 Mannheim	 and	 has	 been	 later	 refined	 and	
empirically	 tested	 (Mannheim,	 1928;	 Krosnick	 and	 Alwin,	 1989;	 Sears	 and	 Funk,	
																																								 																				
9	Some	notable	exceptions	are	the	work	by	Geddes	and	Zaller	(1989)	on	Brazil;	Hainmueller	and	Kern	
(2009)	on	East	Germany	and	some	recent	work	on	China	(e.g.	Wang	2017).	However,	these	studies	
rely	on	unique	national	surveys	and	hence	do	not	allow	for	variation	on	regime	strategies.			
10	Some	have	argued	that	later-life	learning	is	also	important	for	the	formation	of	political	attitudes,	
even	if	these	studies	show	that	early	learning	still	has	the	strongest	effects	(Pop-Eleches	and	Tucker,	
2017;	Dinas	and	Northmore-Ball,	2017).	As	we	focus	on	early	socialization	(during	dictatorships)	and	
ignore	later-life	learning	(during	democracy)	this	should	make	our	results	more	conservative,	as	we	
do	not	account	for	the	potential	revision	of	political	attitudes	during	democratic	times.					
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1999).	 Young	 citizens,	 it	 is	 believed,	 are	not	 yet	 set	 in	 their	 political	ways	 and	 are	
subsequently	more	 easily	 influenced	 by	 external	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
political	regime	in	which	they	live	(Bartels	and	Jackman,	2014).	Political	socialization	
theory	argues	that	after	the	formation	period	in	early	adulthood,	these	attitudes	and	
preferences	 remain	 relatively	 intact	 and	 constant.	 Fundamental	 change	 becomes	
rare	(Jennings,	1989;	Sears	and	Valentino,	1997).	
We	assume	that	citizens’	political	attitudes	that	developed	under	autocracies	
are	 imprinted	 through	 the	 ruling	 strategies	 of	 the	 regime.	 As	 such,	 we	 expect	 to	
observe	 differences	 between	 the	 political	 attitudes	 of	 citizens	 socialized	 in	
inclusionary	 regimes	 and	 exclusionary	 regimes.	 More	 precisely,	 citizens	 from	
inclusionary	 autocracies	 will	 be	 more	 supportive	 of	 that	 regime,	 which	 in	 turn	 is	
expected	 to	 lead	 to	 higher	 nostalgia	 if	 the	 regime	 is	 overthrown.	 If	 citizens	
experience	an	inclusionary	authoritarian	ruling	strategy	in	their	formative	years,	they	
might	value	 the	gains	of	autocratic	 inclusion	higher	 than	potential	 liberal	values	of	
democratic	systems.		
Conversely,	 the	 majority	 of	 citizens	 that	 experienced	 exclusionary	 ruling	
strategies	during	their	formative	years	will	be	less	nostalgic	about	the	autocratic	past	
and	hence	are	expected	to	embrace	democratic	values.	They	did	not	profit	from	the	
former	autocratic	regime	as	they	were	exempted	from	political	power	and	material	
benefits.	 As	 such,	 they	 value	 the	 potential	 gains	 and	 promises	 of	 democratic	
societies	 higher	 compared	 to	 the	 previous	 autocratic	 situation.	 After	
democratization,	 they	 perceive	 themselves	 now	 on	 an	 even	 playing	 field	 that	
provides	equal	chances	for	economic	success	and	political	participation.		
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Finally,	 we	 should	 contrast	 citizens’	 political	 attitudes	 that	 grew	 up	 in	
democratic	and	autocratic	societies.	We	assume	that	citizens	that	were	socialized	in	
democracies	should	be	generally	more	supportive	of	democracy	 than	citizens	 from	
former	autocracies	since	they	developed	democratic	attitudes	and	preferences	early	
on	 in	 their	 life	 by	 living	 in	 a	 democracy	 during	 their	 formative	 years	 (Fuchs-
Schündeln	and	Schündeln,	2015).		
Based	 on	 the	 theory	 of	 political	 socialization	 under	 different	 regime	 forms,	
we	formulate	the	following	hypothesis:		
Hypothesis	 1	 (H1):	Generations	 that	were	 socialized	 in	 inclusionary	autocracies	 are	
more	 supportive	 of	 that	 regime	 and	 are	 therefore	 less	 positive	 with	
democracy	than	generations	that	grew	up	in	exclusionary	autocracies	
or	in	democracies.	
We	 further	hypothesize	 that	 the	 two	dimensions	of	 inclusion	 -	political	 and	
economic	-	interact	and	mutually	strengthen	each	other.	We	argue	that	support	for	
the	 authoritarian	 regime	 and	 the	 subsequent	 nostalgia	 and	 dissatisfaction	 with	
democracy	 becomes	 stronger	 when	 high	 economic	 inclusion	 during	 the	 formative	
years	is	met	with	high	political	inclusion.	We	expect	political	and	economic	inclusion	
to	have	a	stronger	effect	together	than	in	isolation.	We	argue	that	a	doubly	inclusive	
situation	 in	 which	 citizens	 are	 included	 politically	 and	 economically	 included	
amplifies	support	for	the	authoritarian	regime.	This,	in	turn,	translates	into	a	growing	
skepticism	 with	 democracy.	 Against	 this	 backdrop,	 we	 formulate	 a	 reinforcement	
effect	in	hypothesis	2.		
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Hypothesis	(H2):	High	level	of	economic	inclusion	coupled	with	high	political	inclusion	
has	a	negative	effect	on	democratic	support.			
Hypotheses	1	and	2	refer	to	differences	between	regimes.	We	expect	to	find	
clear	generational	differences	 in	terms	of	political	preferences	of	people	who	grew	
up	 under	 different	 regimes	 within	 the	 same	 country	 and	 between	 different	
countries.	However,	all	autocratic	societies	are	heterogeneous	to	some	extent.	The	
selectorate	defines	who	is	included	and	excluded	from	politics.	It	defines	who	might	
potentially	profit	from	the	regime	and	who	is	discriminated	against.	To	be	a	member	
of	the	selectorate	constitutes	a	necessary	condition	for	profiting	from	an	autocratic	
regime.		
We	 define	 insiders	 of	 the	 selectorate	 as	 the	 potential	 “winners”	 of	 an	
autocratic	 regime,	 which	 are	 more	 included	 in	 terms	 of	 political	 and	 economic	
benefits,	while	outsiders	of	the	selectorate	are	“losers”.	While	the	members	of	the	
selectorate	 are	 addressed	 politically	 and	 profit,	 at	 least	 potentially,	 from	 socio-
economic	 redistribution,	 the	 latter	 group	 has	 no	 access	 to	 power	 or	 material	
benefits.	 Against	 this	 backdrop,	 we	 can	 further	 break	 down	 our	 argument	 about	
inclusion	 and	 exclusion.	 We	 expand	 the	 between-regime	 comparison	 to	 the	
composition	 of	 society	within	 an	 existing	 regime.	 We	 would	 expect	 that	 specific	
groups	 that	were	 included	 in	 the	power	and	 socio-economic	benefit	 structure	 (i.e.	
winners)	 are	 more	 supportive	 of	 the	 former	 regime	 than	 those	 that	 have	 been	
excluded	for	social,	ethnic,	or	religious	reasons	(i.e.	losers).	Those	suppressed	groups	
within	 a	 regime	 should	 be	 more	 resistant	 to	 the	 regime	 socialization,	 as	 they	
experience	 first-hand	 the	 exclusive	 nature	 of	 the	 regime	 (Pop-Eleches	 and	 Tucker	
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2017).	 Further,	 we	would	 expect	 them	 to	 be	more	 positive	 about	 the	 democratic	
transition	as	they	gained	the	most	from	the	democratization.	In	this	light,	we	derive	
the	third	hypothesis:	
Hypothesis	 3	 (H3):	 Social	 and	 ethnic	 groups	 included	 in	 the	 selectorate	 of	 an	
autocratic	 regime	 are	more	 supportive	 of	 the	 autocratic	 regime	 and	
therefore	 less	positive	with	democracy	 than	 social	and	ethnic	groups	
excluded	from	it.	
	
Research	design	
In	order	to	test	our	hypotheses,	we	conduct	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	70	(post-)	
authoritarian	 countries	during	 the	entire	20th	 century	 from	around	 the	 globe	 that	
experienced	variations	of	inclusionary	and	exclusionary	regimes.	As	discussed	above,	
we	 identify	 the	 effect	 of	 autocracies	 on	 their	 citizens	 by	 comparing	 generations	
within	 the	 same	 country	 and	 between	 countries	 that	 were	 exposed	 to	 varying	
contexts	 during	 their	 formative	 years.	 This	 empirical	 phenomenon	 of	 varying	
socialization	experiences	within	the	same	country	or	regime	gives	us	the	opportunity	
to	study	 the	 lasting	 imprint	of	political	 regimes,	even	after	 their	existence.	We	are	
further	able	to	contrast	groups	of	generations	that	grew	up	under	dictatorships	and	
those	that	came	of	age	under	democracy.		
To	 achieve	 this	 empirical	 test,	 we	 need	 to	 distinguish	 three	 co-linear	 time	
trends:	 age,	 period,	 and	 cohort	 (APC)	 effects.	 A	 person	 could	 have	 positive	 or	
negative	views	of	democracy	because	she	is	young	(the	so-called	life-cycle	or	ageing	
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effect),	or	because	she	lives	in	a	country	that	faces	a	big	political	corruption	scandal	
(the	so-called	period	effect	that	affects	everyone	no	matter	their	age	or	birth	year),	
or	because	she	was	socialized	at	a	certain	point	 in	history	(the	cohort	effect).	Here	
we	 are	 mainly	 interested	 in	 the	 cohort	 effect,	 which	 we	 argue	 contains	 the	
socialization	 effect	 of	 political	 regimes.	 This	methodological	 approach	 allows	 us	 to	
indirectly	test	the	impact	autocratic	ruling	strategies	have	on	the	mass	public.			
We	conduct	two	sets	of	empirical	tests	to	 investigate	our	three	hypotheses.	
Firstly,	 we	 test	 our	 theory	 contrasting	 inclusionary	 and	 exclusionary	 regimes	 by	
contrasting	them	to	democracies	as	a	baseline	(H1	and	H2).	Second,	we	conduct	two	
within-regime	analyses	where	we	sub-divide	the	population	into	winners	and	losers	
of	 former	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 which	 test	 the	 direct	 effect	 of	 profiting	 from	 an	
autocratic	regime	or	being	particularly	discriminated	(H3).		
Individual-level	data	
To	 test	 our	 hypotheses,	 we	 merge	 existing,	 publicly	 available	 survey	 data	 from	
numerous	countries	 from	around	the	globe	 -	both	well-established	democracies	as	
well	as	former	dictatorships.	We	chose	the	datasets	that	have	been	designed	to	be	
fielded	 in	 several	 countries,	which	 ensures	 that	 questions	 are	 less	 country-specific	
but	rather	to	travel	across	borders.	Furthermore,	all	studies	have	been	conducted	as	
academic	studies	and	hence	adhere	to	a	certain	standard.	Moreover,	we	only	chose	
studies	 that	 included	 questions	 related	 to	 democratic	 attitudes	 and	 political	
engagement.	The	newly	created	harmonized	public	opinion	dataset	combines	1,070	
(country	 x	 wave	 x	 study)	existing	 surveys	 for	 70	 countries	 from	 around	 the	world	
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with	 a	 total	 of	 1,422	 different	 country-cohorts.11	We	 harmonized	 the	 data	 of	 the	
following	public	opinion	surveys	(including	the	years	that	they	were	fielded):	
• World	Values	Survey	(WVS),	1981-2014	
• Latinobarometer	(LB),	1995-2015	
• Asian	Barometer	(ANB),	2001-2014	
• Afrobarometer	(AFB),	1999-2015	
• Americas	Barometer	(AB),	2004-2014	
• European	Values	Study	(EVS),	1981-2010	
• European	Social	Survey	(ESS),	2002-2014	
• Eurobarometer	(EB),	1970-2002	
• Central	&	Eastern	European	Barometer	(CEEB),	1990-97	
• Comparative	Study	of	Electoral	Systems	(CSES),	1996-2015	
	
Pooling	all	these	datasets	together	gives	us	about	1.3	million	respondents	for	
which	we	have	valid	data	on	two	dependent	variables	and	all	control	variables.	The	
different	survey	questions	included	in	the	diverse	datasets	were	harmonized	so	that	
a	joint	analysis	is	possible.	More	details	on	the	question	of	harmonization	decisions	
can	be	found	in	Appendices	3	and	4.	
Dependent	variables:	Authoritarian	nostalgia	and	democratic	support		
In	 order	 to	 measure	 the	 impact	 inclusionary	 and	 exclusionary	 regimes	 had	 on	
people’s	hearts	and	minds,	we	ideally	want	to	measure	support	for	the	authoritarian	
regime.	Unfortunately,	it	is	not	possible	to	measure	regime	support	in	a	direct	way,	
as	public	opinion	surveys	are	usually	not	available.	An	 indirect	measure	 for	 regime	
support	 is	however	whether	people	 feel	nostalgic	 for	 these	 regimes	once	 they	are	
overthrown.	Using	the	third	wave	(1999/2000)	of	the	EVS,	we	can	use	a	question	on	
																																								 																				
11	We	only	include	countries	for	which	we	have	at	least	three	surveys	that	cover	at	least	10	years.	This	
is	an	important	prerequisite	to	estimate	HAPC	models,	 introduced	below.	The	list	of	countries	and	
the	number	of	respondents	per	country	can	be	found	in	Appendix	1.	
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evaluating	the	former	Communist	regime	as	good	or	bad12	for	14	Central	and	Eastern	
European	countries.13	As	we	have	postulated	in	our	theory,	we	expect	that	nostalgia	
for	the	previous	authoritarian	regime	affect	the	evaluation	of	democracy.14	The	EVS	
data	allows	us	to	explore	the	relationship	between	authoritarian	nostalgia	(support)	
and	democratic	support,	which	we	are	able	to	measure	across	time	and	a	large	set	of	
countries.		
We	assume	 that	 the	higher	nostalgia	with	 the	Communist	 regime	 the	more	
critical	people	would	be	with	democracy.	Figure	1	plots	this	correlation	with	our	two	
dependent	variables	–	“satisfaction	with	democracy”	(Fig.	1.A)	and	“democracy	is	the	
best	form	of	government”	(Fig.	1.B)	-	using	our	14	countries	and	three	generations,	
those	 that	 grew-up	 before,	 during,	 or	 after	 the	 Cold	 War.	 Plotting	 the	 average	
nostalgia	and	democratic	support	for	each	country-cohort,	Figure	1	shows	nostalgia	
is	weakest	among	the	generation	that	grew-up	after	the	end	of	Communism,	which	
is	 what	 we	 would	 expect	 based	 on	 our	 theory.	 The	 individual-level	 correlation	
between	satisfaction	with	democracy	and	authoritarian	nostalgia	is	r=-0.43,	which	is	
																																								 																				
12	The	exact	question	wording	to	evaluate	today’s	political	system	is	as	follows:	“People	have	different	
views	 about	 the	 system	 for	 governing	 this	 country.	Here	 is	 a	 scale	 for	 rating	how	well	 things	 are	
going:	1	means	very	bad;	10	means	very	good”.	
13	These	include:	Bulgaria,	Belarus,	Czech	Republic,	Estonia,	East	Germany,	Hungary,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	
Poland,	Romania,	Russia,	Slovak	Republic,	Slovenia,	and	Ukraine.	
14	In	order	to	test	our	hypotheses	it	is	essential	to	identify	the	cohort	effects	properly	and	distinguish	
these	 from	 aging	 effects.	 However,	 the	 data	 that	 directly	measures	 authoritarian	 nostalgia	 is	 not	
suitable	 for	 this.	Firstly,	having	data	only	 from	one	point	 in	 time	does	not	allow	the	separation	of	
age	and	cohort	effects,	which	is	crucial	 in	our	theoretical	framework	of	authoritarian	socialization.	
Secondly,	the	EVS	data	only	includes	former	Communist	countries,	which	do	not	give	us	variation	on	
the	key	independent	variable	-	regime	inclusiveness.	The	regimes	were	too	similar	in	this	respect.	
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strong.	 The	 correlation	 is	 even	 stronger	 between	 democracy	 as	 the	 best	 form	 of	
government	and	Communist	nostalgia	(r=-0.68).15		
	
Figure	1:	Correlation	between	Communist	nostalgia	and	democratic	support	
The	 findings	 of	 Figure	 1	 supports	 our	 assumption	 that	 using	 measures	 of	
democratic	support	are	suitable	proxies	for	authoritarian	support	(nostalgia).	For	the	
remainder	 of	 the	 article	we	 therefore	 use	measures	 of	 democratic	 support,	which	
have	a	higher	 longitudinal	and	geographic	coverage	and	hence	allow	us	to	test	our	
three	hypotheses	more	accurately.		
Political	support	is	one	of	the	key	factors	in	the	development	of	a	democratic	
political	culture	(Almond	and	Verba,	1963;	Easton,	1965).	The	aim	is	to	measure	the	
extent	 to	which	citizens	 support	 the	democratic	 system	using	 the	 satisfaction	with	
the	way	democracy	works.	We	 thereby	 assume	 that	 the	 expression	of	 satisfaction	
asks	respondents	to	evaluate	the	performance	of	the	political	system	(Norris,	1999;	
																																								 																				
15	 Appendix	 5	 includes	 further	 exploration	 of	 the	 measure	 of	 authoritarian	 nostalgia,	 including	 its	
prevalence	and	generational	differences.	
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Linde	 and	 Ekman,	 2003).16	 Further,	 asking	 citizens	 about	 the	 ‘‘satisfaction	 with	
democracy’’	 is	 less	 abstract	 than	 the	usual	 question	of	 support	 for	 ‘‘democracy	 as	
the	best	way	of	government’’,	which	we	do	however	use	in	a	separate	test,	too.		
In	the	datasets	that	were	harmonized	for	this	study,	respondents	were	asked	
uniformly	 how	 satisfied	 are	 you	with	 the	way	democracy	works	 in	 your	 country.17	
Response	categories	however	varied	from	4	to	11.	The	variable	was	standardized	to	
0	to	100,	whereas	 lower	values	mean	 less	satisfaction	with	democracy.	To	account	
for	the	specific	effects	due	to	study	design	or	questionnaire	design,	we	include	the	
study	(e.g.	WVS,	ESS,	etc.)	as	a	control	variable	into	the	model,	which	also	accounts	
for	the	difference	in	response	categories.18			
Individual-level	control	variables	
We	 control	 for	 the	 gender	 of	 respondents,	 the	 education	 level	 (primary	 or	 less,	
secondary,	 post-secondary)19	 and	 a	 dummy	 variable	 whether	 a	 respondent	 is	
working	as	opposed	to	being	unemployed,	retired	or	any	other	reason	why	people	
do	not	work.20		
																																								 																				
16	 In	 the	 analysis	 presented	 below	we	 refrain	 from	 including	 countries	 in	 the	 analysis	 that	 are	 not	
classified	 as	 democratic	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 survey.	 We	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 not	 meaningful	 to	 ask	
respondents	to	evaluate	how	the	democratic	system	works	in	their	country	if	they	do	not	live	in	a	
democracy.	 Using	 this	 restriction	 reduces	 the	 sample	 by	 21	 countries	 for	 which	 data	 would	 be	
available.	The	results	are	not	sensitive	to	the	inclusion	of	these	contemporary	autocracies.	
17	The	question	wording	and	response	categories	in	each	study	are	listed	in	Appendix	3.		
18	The	estimates	of	these	are	not	reported	in	the	results	tables,	but	are	available	upon	request	from	
the	authors.		
19	 For	 this	we	use	 the	 categorical	 variable	 that	measures	 a	 person’s	 highest	 educational	 degree.	 In	
some	datasets	education	was	measured	as	years	of	education	or	age	of	leaving	school.	The	coding	
scheme	 to	 classify	 respondents	 into	 the	 three	 education	 groups	 based	 on	 this	 is	 explained	 in	
Appendix	3.	Combing	the	education	variables	(categorical	and	measured	from	years)	leaves	only	2%	
still	missing.	
20	 Unfortunately,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 control	 a	 person’s	 income	 or	 economic	 well-being	 beyond	
working,	as	the	measures	were	too	diverse	to	be	harmonized.	
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Measuring	inclusionary	and	exclusionary	regimes	
Data	 on	 the	 inclusionary	 and	 exclusionary	 regime	 dimensions	 comes	 from	 the	
Varieties	 of	 Democracy	 (V-Dem)	 project	 (Coppedge	 et	 al.,	 2016).21	 The	 unit	 of	
observation	 in	 our	 sample	 is	 country-year	 (1915-2015),	 for	 the	 70	 countries	 for	
which	we	have	survey	data.		
	 We	capture	political	 inclusiveness	by	calculating	the	average	score	between	
two	indicators:	power	distribution	by	social	group	and	by	socio-economic	status.	The	
former	 variable	 captures	 whether	 any	 social	 group22	 is	 more	 politically	 relevant	
compared	to	other	social	groups	in	that	country.	It	is	an	ordinal	measure	that	ranges	
from	 monopoly	 of	 one	 group	 (value=0)	 to	 all	 social	 groups	 having	 equal	 political	
power	 (value=4).23	 The	 later	 variable	 captures	 whether	 more	 wealth	 and	 income	
translates	 into	 more	 political	 power	 for	 citizens	 and	 groups.	 It	 is	 also	 an	 ordinal	
variable	ranging	from	wealthy	people	enjoying	monopoly	over	political	power	(0)	to	
political	power	being	more	or	less	equally	distributed	across	economic	groups	(4).	
Economic	inclusiveness	of	regimes	is	captured	using	a	measure	of	the	type	of	
expenditures	used	by	the	regime.	It	is	an	ordinal	variable	ranging	from	particularistic	
spending	 targeted	 towards	 specific	 societal	 actors	 (0)	 to	 public	 spending	 being	
intended	to	benefit	all	groups	within	a	society,	including	the	poor	or	underprivileged	
(4).	
																																								 																				
21	The	V-Dem	project	collects	data	on	political	institutions	with	the	help	of	more	than	3,000	country-
experts.	The	V-Dem	project	uses	a	Bayesian	 item	response	model	to	 increase	the	reliability	of	 the	
coding	and	eliminate	as	much	of	individual	coders’	bias.	Due	to	the	richness	and	high	quality	of	the	
data	we	prefer	V-Dem	over	other	data.	 It	 should	moreover	be	noted	 that	 the	 level	of	 agreement	
between	V-Dem	and	other	datasets	is	over	90%	(Lührmann	et	al.,	2018).	
22	A	social	group	can	be	delimited	within	a	country	by	caste,	ethnicity,	language,	race,	region,	religion,	
or	some	combination	of	theses.	
23	See	part	A6	of	the	online	appendix	for	a	full	description	of	these	variables.	
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As	 the	 hypotheses	 also	 focus	 on	 the	 distinction	 between	 autocracies	 and	
democracy,	we	use	an	 indicator	 for	 regime	type	that	 is	based	on	V-Dem’s	electoral	
democracy	index,	whereby	the	absence	of	democracy	measures	autocracy.	The	index	
is	continuous	and	ranges	between	0	and	1,	where	higher	values	indicate	democracy.	
We	 follow	 Lindberg	 (2016)	 and	 dichotomize	 this	 measure	 where	 a	 regime	 with	 a	
value	of	the	index	equal	or	above	0.67	is	considered	a	democracy	and	an	autocracy	
otherwise.		
	
Figure	2:	Average	political	power	and	economic	inclusion	by	regime	type	
Figure	2	shows	the	distribution	of	regimes	based	on	the	average	measure	of	
political	 power	 and	 economic	 inclusiveness	 by	 regime	 type.	 The	 countries	 in	 the	
bottom	 left	 corners	 in	 Figure	 2	 are	 regimes	 the	 exclude	 citizens	 based	 on	 social	
group	 membership	 and	 wealth,	 and	 also	 whose	 public	 goods	 spending	 is	
particularistic.	We	observe	that,	on	average,	democracies	tend	to	have	higher	levels	
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of	 inclusion	 into	 power	 and	more	 public	 goods	 provision.	 Conversely,	 autocracies	
that	 exclude	 citizens	 based	 on	 socio-economic	 status	 or	 social	 group	membership	
also	 tend	 to	 use	more	 particularistic	 spending	 rather	 than	 public	 goods	 provision.	
This	pattern	is	consistent	with	the	logic	of	the	selectorate	theory	as	regimes	will	be	
more	 likely	 to	 rely	 on	 public	 goods	 provision	 as	 the	 size	 of	 their	 selectorate	 and	
winning	coalition	increases	(Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al.,	2003).		
	 All	 variables	 are	 continuous,	 except	 the	 dummy	 variable	 that	 measures	
whether	 the	 regime	 was	 an	 autocracy	 or	 democracy.	 The	 macro	 variables	 are	
averaged	 across	 five-year	 intervals	 from	 1915	 to	 2015	 and	 matched	 to	 the	
corresponding	 national	 generation	 that	 came	 of	 age	 during	 a	 particular	 five-year	
period.24		
Macro	control	variables	
Several	variables	are	included	in	the	models	to	rule	out	the	possibility	that	citizens’	
democratic	satisfaction	is	not	explained	by	the	current	state	of	affairs	in	their	polity	
and	economy	(Karp	el	al.,	2003;	Wagner	et	al.,	2009).	First,	we	include	the	economic	
development	 level	by	 including	GDP	per	capita	at	 the	2011	PPP	value	of	 the	dollar	
(source:	World	Bank),	as	we	expect	that	economic	performance	of	the	regime	affects	
people’s	reported	satisfaction	with	democracy	(Lipset,	1960;	Krieckhaus	et	al.,	2013).	
Second,	 we	 include	 the	 current	 level	 of	 democracy,	 as	 the	 type	 of	 democratic	
political	 system	 in	 which	 citizens	 live	 affects	 their	 views	 of	 democracy	 (Wells	 and	
																																								 																				
24	1915	 is	 the	starting	point,	as	we	do	not	have	a	sufficient	number	of	 individual-level	observations	
that	 belong	 to	 generations	 born	 before	 1900	 and	 hence	were	 socialized	 before	 1915.	 Separating	
cohorts	 into	 five-year	 birth	 groups	 is	 standard	 practice	 in	 cohort	 analysis	 (Fienberg	 and	 Mason,	
1979;	Mason	et	al.,	1973).	As	we	do	a	cross-national	analysis	with	70	countries	it	is	not	possible	to	
separate	cohorts	in	more	meaningful	groups	that	overlap	with	historical	events.		
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Krieckhaus,	 2006;	 Anderson	 and	 Guillory,	 1997).	 Third,	 we	 include	 the	 age	 of	 the	
democratic	 system	 because	 the	 amount	 of	 time	 an	 individual	 has	 lived	 in	 a	
democracy	 might	 affect	 a	 citizens’	 democratic	 attitudes	 (Fuchs-Schündeln	 and	
Schündeln,	2015).	Finally,	we	include	the	level	of	political	corruption25	(Wagner	et	al.	
2009),	 as	 citizens	 engage	 in	 comparing	 how	well	 democracy	 deals	with	 corruption	
compared	to	autocracies	(Rose-Ackerman	1996).	
The	model	
As	outlined	above,	we	 take	a	 generational	perspective	 to	 test	our	hypotheses	 and	
thereby	rely	on	an	age,	period,	cohort	(APC)	model.	The	most	important	covariates	
are	therefore,	firstly,	the	age	of	the	respondents,	which	we	include	as	age	in	years.	
Secondly,	we	measure	cohorts	in	five-year	groupings	when	respondents	turned	15,26	
assuming	 that	 this	 is	 the	 time	 of	 socialization	 when	 the	 political	 regime	 has	 the	
strongest	and	lasting	 impact	on	its	citizens	(Bartels	and	Jackman,	2014).	Finally,	we	
include	 the	 year	 of	 the	 survey	 to	 capture	 the	 period	 effect.	 The	 problem	 of	
estimating	these	three	time	effects	simultaneously	is	the	identification	problem,	as:	
Cohort	=	Survey	Year	-	Age	
Yang	 and	 Land	 (2006)	 proposed	 to	 solve	 this	 identification	 problem	 by	
including	cohort	clusters	(in	our	case	five-year	groups)	and	survey	years	as	random	
effects	into	a	Hierarchical	Age-Period-Cohort	(HAPC)	model.	In	this	multilevel	model	
																																								 																				
25	See	section	A6	of	the	appendix	for	a	more	detail	description	of	the	variables	mentioned	above.	
26	We	test	the	sensitivity	of	this	specification	by	firstly	changing	the	cohort	grouping	and	secondly	the	
age	of	the	formative	years.	The	results	are	discussed	below	in	the	robustness	test	section	as	well	as	
in	Appendix	12.	
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we	consider	periods	and	cohorts	as	cross-classified	contexts	in	which	individuals	are	
nested.	Including	macro-level	variables	that	capture	the	cohort	context	(inclusionary	
versus	exclusionary	autocracy	at	age	15)	as	well	as	the	period	context	(current	level	
economic	and	political	measures	in	the	same	year	as	survey	is	conducted)	allows	to	
test	 the	 effect	 of	 these	 context	 variables	 on	 democratic	 attitudes.	 The	 model	 is	
specified	as:	
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡!"#$ =  𝛼!"# +  𝛽! 𝐴𝑔𝑒!" +  𝛽! 𝑋!"!!!! + ϒ!  𝐶 +
!
!!!  𝜀!"#$   
where	we	model	support	for	democracy	of	respondent’s	 i	who	belongs	to	cohort	 j,	
was	 interviewed	 in	 year	 t	 and	 lives	 in	 country	 c	 as	 a	 function	 of	 her	 age	 and	 our	
individual-level	 control	 variables	 X.	 We	 further	 include	 country-fixed	 effects	 to	
account	 for	 potential	 country-specific	 differences,	 such	 as	 responding	 to	 survey	
questions.	The	most	important	part	of	this	model	is	the	random	intercept	𝛼!"#,	which	
can	be	written	as:	𝛼!"# =  𝛾! + 𝛾!𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐 ! +  𝛾!𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙! +  𝛾!𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐 !𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙! + 𝛾!!!!! 𝑉!" +  𝑢!!! +	𝑢!!!	
where	ϒ! measures	the	grand	mean.	ϒ!-ϒ!	measure	the	impact	of	the	each	cohort’s	
formative	context,	measured	as	five-year	average	contexts	when	respondents	were	
between	 15	 and	 20	 years	 old,	 a	 specification	 which	 is	 scrutinized	 in	 a	 series	 of	
robustness	tests.	We	test	H1	with	an	interaction	between	the	level	of	inclusiveness	
(political	or	economic)	and	whether	the	country	at	the	time	was	an	autocracy.	If	H1	
is	 correct,	we	expect	ϒ!	 to	be	negative	 and	 significant.	 The	vector	V	measures	 the	
current	 period	 effects,	 which	 measured	 on	 the	 country-level	 at	 the	 year	 of	 the	
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survey.	Here	we	treat	our	dependent	variables	as	continuous,	estimating	linear	HAPC	
models.			
Global	analysis:	Between	regime	variation		
In	 this	 section,	we	 present	 the	 empirical	 results	 of	 a	 global	 cohort	 analysis	 of	 the	
impact	of	autocratic	 inclusiveness	on	democratic	 support	 that	utilizes	 the	between	
regime	 differences,	with	 some	 people	 having	 experienced	 an	 autocracy	 and	 some	
not	within	the	same	country	and	across	countries.		
Descriptive	analysis	
First,	we	graphically	explore	the	relationship	between	inclusiveness	and	democratic	
support.	 Figure	 3	 plots	 the	 average	 satisfaction	 with	 democracy,	 our	 main	
dependent	variable,	for	each	of	the	1,422	cohorts	in	our	62	countries.	We	graphically	
distinguish	between	those	generations	that	grew	up	in	an	autocratic	(panels	A	and	C)	
or	democratic	system	(panels	B	and	D)	according	to	the	level	of	political	(top	panels)	
and	economic	inclusion	(bottom	panels).	
As	 Figure	 3	 clearly	 shows,	 cohorts	 that	 grew	 up	 in	 more	 inclusive	
dictatorships	 -	 whether	 economically	 or	 politically	 -	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 evaluate	 the	
democratic	 system	 as	 positive	 compared	 to	 cohorts	 that	 were	 socialized	 in	 more	
exclusive	regimes.	We	compare	these	results	to	democracies	that	give	us	a	reference	
point	of	the	relationship	between	inclusiveness	and	democratic	support.	As	the	two	
right	panels	in	Figure	3	confirm,	the	relationship	is	reversed	in	democracies.	Cohorts	
that	 grew	 up	 in	 more	 inclusive	 democracies	 are	 also	 more	 positive	 towards	 the	
functioning	of	the	democratic	system	today.	
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Figure	3:	Mean	satisfaction	with	democracy	(by	country-cohort)	over	political	and	
economic	inclusion	during	cohort’s	formative	years	(at	c)	
In	 the	 next	 section,	 we	 use	 HAPC	 models	 to	 test	 whether	 the	 graphical	
pattern	shown	in	Figure	3	holds	when	we	use	more	rigorous	models	that	account	for	
age,	period	and	cohort	effects	as	well	as	include	important	control	variables	on	both	
the	micro	and	macro	level.		
Results	HAPC	Models	
We	estimate	a	hierarchical	Age,	Period,	Cohort	(HAPC)	model	as	introduced	above	to	
predict	 a	 respondent	 level	 of	 democratic	 support,	 which	 varies	 from	 0	 to	 100,	
whereas	 higher	 values	 indicate	 higher	 support.	 Including	 an	 interaction	 effect	 of	
inclusionary	strategies	and	whether	the	country	was	an	autocracy	at	the	time	each	
cohort	was	socialized	tests	hypothesis	1.		
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Table	1:	Linear	HAPC	model	predicting	satisfaction	with	democracy		
	 M1	–	Pol.	Power	 	 M2	–	Public	good	 	 M3	–	Interaction	
	 coef.	 s.e.	 	 coef.	 s.e.	 	 coef.	 s.e.	
Age	 0.086***		 (0.005)	 	 0.094***		 (0.004)	 	 0.086***		 (0.004)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Socialization	Context	(at	c)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Autocracy	 6.815***		 (0.867)	 	 6.358***		 (0.736)	 	 -14.850***		(1.969)	
Political	power	 2.681***		 (0.337)	 	 	 	 	 -6.541***		 (0.810)	
Autocracy	x	political	power	 -4.864***		 (0.289)	 	 	 	 	 7.384***		 (0.838)	
Public	good		 	 	 	 3.307***		 (0.236)	 	 -4.670***		 (0.755)	
Autocracy	x	Public	good		 	 	 	 -4.174***		 (0.229)	 	 7.640***		 (0.809)	
Pol.	Power	x	public	good	 	 	 	 	 	 	 2.676***		 (0.266)	
Autoc.	x	pol.	Power	x	publ.	Good		 	 	 	 	 	 -4.040***		 (0.297)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Current	context	(at	t)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Level	of	democracy	 -34.547***		 (8.561)	 	 -34.656***		 (8.560)	 	 -34.684***		(8.548)	
Age	of	democracy	 -0.180***		 (0.045)	 	 -0.184***		 (0.045)	 	 -0.181***		 (0.045)	
Log	GDP	(per	C)	 2.923***		 (0.737)	 	 2.864***		 (0.737)	 	 2.934***		 (0.736)	
Political	corruption	 -2.766	 (7.548)	 	 -2.947	 (7.547)	 	 -2.829	 (7.536)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Individual-level	controls	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Female	 -0.399***		 (0.047)	 	 -0.400***		 (0.047)	 	 -0.401***		 (0.047)	
Education	(ref:	primary)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Secondary	 0.290***		 (0.065)	 	 0.282***		 (0.065)	 	 0.290***		 (0.065)	
Post-Secondary	 2.317***		 (0.077)	 	 2.315***		 (0.077)	 	 2.321***		 (0.077)	
Working	 1.329***		 (0.053)	 	 1.332***		 (0.053)	 	 1.320***		 (0.053)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Country	FE	 yes	 	 	 yes	 	 	 yes	 	
Data	FE	 yes	 	 	 yes	 	 	 yes	 	
Intercept	 45.119***		 (10.257)	 	 43.958***		 (10.235)	 	 62.083***		(10.391)	
Variance	Component	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Cohort	(1900-2010)	 2.437***		 (0.079)	 	 2.415***		 (0.079)	 	 2.046***		 (0.068)	
Period	(1973-2015)	 5.758***		 (0.149)	 	 5.757***		 (0.149)	 	 5.749***		 (0.149)	
N	(of	respondents)	 1,245,690	 	 	 1,245,690	 	 	 1,245,690	 	
N	(of	countries)	 62	 	 	 62	 	 	 62	 	
AIC	 11,584,451	 	 	 11,584,437	 	 	11,584,211	 	
Significance:	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	P<0.01.	Data:	Harmonized	survey	data	from	1,070	national	
datasets.	List	of	datasets	in	Appendix	2.	V-Dem,	1915-2015.		
Note:	Entries	are	regression	coefficients	and	their	standard	errors	of	a	HAPC	model.	The	dependent	
variable	varies	from	e.g.	0=”not	satisfied	at	all”	and	100=”completely	satisfied”.		
	
Table	 1	 reports	 the	 impact	 of	 two	 dimensions	 of	 regime	 strategies	 on	 satisfaction	
with	democracy,	 our	 first	 dependent	 variable.	Model	 1	presents	 the	 results	 of	 the	
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impact	 of	 access	 to	 political	 power.	 The	 results	 confirm	our	 hypothesis.	 The	more	
access	 autocracies	 provided	 to	 their	 citizens	 the	 lower	 the	 satisfaction	 with	
democracy	today	(ϒ!=-4.864).	With	every	unit	increase	in	access	to	political	power,	
democratic	 satisfaction	 is	 2.183	 lower	 among	 generations	 of	 former	 dictatorships.	
The	 main	 effect	 of	 the	 dummy	 variable	 capturing	 the	 regime	 type	 relates	 to	
autocracies	that	were	completely	politically	exclusionary	(holding	all	other	variables	
at	 their	 mean),	 which	 produces	 higher	 democratic	 satisfaction	 levels	 even	 than	
compared	to	cohorts	that	grew-up	 in	democracies	 (ϒ!=6.815).	The	same	pattern	 is	
confirmed	 for	 the	second	dimension	of	 inclusiveness	 -	access	 to	political	 resources	
via	 public	 good	 provision	 –	 presented	 in	 Model	 2.	 All	 effects	 are	 statistically	
significant	on	the	1%	level.	
	
Figure	4:	Predicted	satisfaction	with	democracy	(A+B)	and	agreement	that	
democracy	is	best	form	of	government	(C+D)	by	regime	socialization	
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Note:	The	prediction	is	based	on	a	linear	HAPC	model.	Full	results	shown	in	Table	1.	The	results	
presented	in	panel	C	and	D	are	reported	in	Appendix	8.	
	
	
These	 effects	 are	 further	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 4,	 which	 plots	 the	 predicted	
values	 of	 the	 two	 dependent	 variables,	 for	 the	 varying	 levels	 of	 political	 and	
economic	inclusion	distinguishing	for	having	been	socialized	in	a	democracy	(dashed	
line)	versus	an	autocracy	(solid	line).	Figures	4.A	and	4.B	plot	the	predicted	values	of	
satisfaction	with	democracies,	which	is	based	on	M1	and	M2	of	the	results	presented	
in	 Table	 1.	 For	 example,	 Figure	 4.A	 shows	 a	 steep,	 negative	 slope	 for	 autocracies.	
Satisfaction	with	democracy	 is	 predicted	 to	be	at	 52	points	 (so	positive)	 in	 former	
extremely	politically	exclusionary	regimes	(score=0).	However,	if	a	respondent	grew	
up	 in	 a	 very	 politically	 inclusionary	 regime	 (score=4),	 predicted	 satisfaction	 with	
democracy	is	8.732	points	lower.	We	can	also	compare	this	effect	to	those	that	grew	
up	 in	 democracies.	Here	 as	 one	might	 expect,	we	 find	 a	 positive	 effect.	 The	more	
access	to	political	power	or	economic	resources	were	available	in	people’s	youth	the	
more	positive	they	seem	to	be	about	democracy	today.	
Figures	4.C	and	4.D	 further	plot	 the	main	 results	 for	our	 second	dependent	
variable,	whether	people	agree	that	democracy	is	the	best	form	of	government.	The	
results	 are	 less	 strong	 for	 this	 variable,	however,	H1	 is	nevertheless	 confirmed.	As	
predicted	by	our	theory,	those	exposed	to	more	inclusive	regimes	are	more	critical	
with	 democracy,	 which	 we	 interpret	 as	 a	 form	 of	 nostalgia	 and	 support	 for	 the	
previous	dictatorship.	
In	the	next	step	we	turn	to	our	test	of	Hypothesis	2,	which	postulates	that	the	
political	and	economic	dimension	of	inclusiveness	reinforce	each	other.	We	test	this	
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hypothesis	using	a	three-way	interaction	between	the	values	of	our	two	dimensions	
and	the	regime	type	at	the	time	when	respondents	were	socialized.	The	results	are	
presented	in	Model	3	of	Table	1.	Interpreting	three-way	interactions	is	not	straight-
forward	and	we	therefore	focus	on	the	graphical	interpretation	presented	in	Figure	
5.	Figure	5	plots	the	marginal	effects	of	access	to	political	power	on	satisfaction	with	
democracy	 for	 different	 levels	 of	 public	 good	 provision.	 Again,	 we	 distinguish	
between	 the	 regime	 type	 -	 democracies	 (dashed	 line)	 and	 autocracies	 (solid	 line).	
The	 marginal	 effects	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 the	 regression	 coefficient	 for	 political	
power	inclusiveness.		
As	Figure	5	demonstrates,	 in	autocracies	 that	 rely	on	excessive	public	 good	
provision	 (value=4),	 increasing	 political	 power	 will	 lead	 to	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	
satisfaction	with	democracy.	Given	the	marginal	effect	of	about	4.8,	going	from	no	
political	access	to	full	access,	would	decrease	democratic	satisfaction	by	19.2	points	
on	a	0-100	scale.	This	impact	of	political	inclusiveness	is	weaker	in	countries	that	are	
less	economically	generous,	which	confirms	hypothesis	2.		
Interestingly,	Figure	5	also	reveals	that	if	an	autocracy	relies	on	the	provision	
of	particularistic	goods	only	(value=0),	increasing	access	to	political	power	will	have	a	
positive	 effect	 on	 democratic	 satisfaction.	 Here	 the	 positive	 legacy	 effect	 of	
economic	 exclusiveness	 seems	 to	 outweigh	 the	 negative	 effect	 of	 higher	 political	
inclusiveness.	The	effect	 is	however	 relatively	 small	 and	 significant	only	on	 the	5%	
level.	In	appendix	9	we	further	present	these	results	plotting	the	marginal	effects	of	
public	good	provision	against	political	power.27		
																																								 																				
27	 In	 Appendix	 10	we	 present	 additional	 results	 replicating	 the	 analysis	 testing	H3	 by	 using	 a	 four-
category	 regime	 typology	 of	 politically	 and	 economically	 exclusionary	 versus	 inclusionary	 regimes	
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Figure	5:	Marginal	effects	of	access	to	political	power	on	satisfaction	with	democracy	
by	public	good	provision		
Note:	The	prediction	is	based	on	a	linear	HAPC	model.	Full	results	shown	in	M3	in	Table	1.	
	
Robustness	tests	
We	 test	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 our	 results	 using	 a	 series	 of	 additional	 tests,	 which	 are	
presented	in	Appendices	11	and	12.	Firstly,	we	exchange	our	measure	of	economic	
inclusiveness	 by	 using	 income	 at	 the	 time	 of	 socialization	 instead	 of	 public	 good	
provision.28	 We	 replace	 the	 level	 of	 economic	 inclusiveness	 of	 the	 regime	
(particularistic	vs	public	goods	provision)	with	the	level	of	inequality	for	the	following	
reason:	the	level	of	inequality	of	a	regime	should	be	the	product	of	the	redistributive	
policies	of	the	regime.	More	simply,	if	a	regime	provides	more	public	goods,	then	the	
level	 of	 inequality	 should	 be	 lower	 compared	 to	 cases	 when	 the	 regime	 provides	
particularistic	 goods.	 If	 that	 is	 true,	 then	we	 should	observe	 the	 following:	 citizens	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
with	two	hybrid	types	in	the	middle.	The	results	confirm	the	findings	presented	above.	Authoritarian	
regimes	that	were	both	inclusive	in	their	access	to	political	power	as	well	as	widely	provided	public	
good	 have	 the	 most	 critical	 citizens	 with	 democracy	 today.	 This	 confirms	 our	 reinforcement	
hypothesis.		
28	Income	inequality	is	measured	using	the	Gini	coefficient	based	on	Haber	and	Menaldo	(2011)	and	
updated	by	V-Dem	to	today	(Coppedge	et	al.	2016).	
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socialized	 under	 higher	 inequality	 should	 be	 more	 satisfied	 with	 democracy	
compared	to	citizens	socialized	under	lower	inequality.	The	analysis	using	inequality	
shows	that	satisfaction	with	democracy	of	post-1945	cohorts	increase	as	the	level	of	
inequality	of	their	regime	increases.	
Secondly,	 other	 characteristics	 of	 authoritarian	 regimes	 could	 drive	 their	
legacy	 on	 democratic	 attitudes.	 We	 therefore	 re-run	 the	 analysis	 including	 two	
additional	 factors	 to	 account	 for	 the	 characteristics	 of	 regimes,	 when	 different	
generations	were	socialized.	Firstly,	we	account	for	physical	repression,	measured	by	
torture	and	political	killings.29	Autocracies	often	use	hard	repression	as	another	tool	
to	 control	 the	 mass	 population.	 The	 level	 of	 repression	 also	 could	 affect	 the	
inclusiveness	of	the	regime,	with	more	exclusive	regimes	using	more	physical	 force	
than	 inclusive	regimes.	We	therefore	add	this	control	variable	to	our	main	models,	
presented	 in	 Table	 1,	Model	 3,	 predicting	 satisfaction	with	 democracy.	 The	 three-
way	interaction	effect	between	the	two	dimensions	of	inclusiveness	and	growing-up	
in	a	dictatorship	is	slightly	reduced	(from	b=-4.040,	p<0.000	in	M3	in	Table	1	to	b=-
3.640,	 p<0.000).	 This	 differences	 is	 however	 not	 significant.	 This	 indicates	 that	
indeed	some	of	the	effect	of	regime	inclusiveness	 is	through	the	use	of	repression,	
which	 has	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	 democratic	 satisfaction.	 The	 less	 repressive	 the	
regime	was	during	 a	 respondent’s	 formative	 years,	 the	more	positive	 she	 is	 about	
democracy	(b=4.080,	p<0.001).		
																																								 																				
29	We	 use	 the	 physical	 integrity	 index	 from	V-Dem	 that	 ranges	 from	 0	 to	 1,	whereas	 lower	 values	
indicate	more	repression.	More	information	in	Appendix	6.5.1.		
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	 Further,	we	 account	 for	 the	 level	 of	 economic	 development	 at	 the	 time	 of	
regime	socialization	measured	using	logged	GPD	(per	capita).30	We	could	argue	that	
the	 level	of	political	and	economic	 inclusiveness	depends	 in	part	how	developed	a	
country	is	in	general.	In	poor	countries,	public	provision	of	services	and	inclusion	of	
ordinary	 citizens	 into	 the	 political	 process	 might	 be	 more	 important	 than	 in	 very	
developed	countries,	where	citizens	are	less	dependent	on	state	provision.	In	order	
to	test	this	argument,	we	include	logged	GDP	(per	capita)	in	the	model	as	a	control	
variable	 (see	 Table	 A11,	 M3.1	 in	 the	 Appendix).	 Controlling	 for	 economic	
development	 significantly	 reduces	 the	 three-way	 interaction	effect,	which	 tests	H2	
(b=-2.080,	 p<0.000).	 This	 implies	 that	 some	 of	 the	 legacy	 impact	 of	 authoritarian	
ruling	strategies	is	dependent	on	the	level	of	economic	development.		
We	 explore	 this	 further	 by	 repeating	 the	 analysis	 on	 the	 subset	 of	 cohorts	
that	grew	up	in	autocracies	and	interacted	the	level	of	economic	inclusiveness	that	
they	 were	 exposed	 to	 and	 the	 nation’s	 logged	 GDP	 (see	 Table	 A11,	 M3.2).	 The	
impact	 of	 public	 good	 provision	 is	 the	 strongest	 for	 mid-level	 countries	 and	
insignificant	when	 countries	 are	 very	 poor	 or	 very	 rich.	 Poor	 countries	will	 not	 be	
able	to	credibly	supply	public	goods	to	its	citizens	and	in	very	rich	countries	it	might	
not	 matter	 whether	 the	 regime	 provides	 goods	 or	 not,	 as	 citizens	 might	 just	
generally	profit	from	the	wealth	of	the	country.	Importantly,	the	results	do	confirm	
the	 hypothesis	 that	 more	 economically	 inclusive	 regimes	 produce	 long-term	
																																								 																				
30	As	our	macro	data	goes	back	to	1915,	we	had	to	compile	historical	GDP	using	1990	value	of	Geary-
Khamis	 dollar	 from	 the	Maddison	 project.	 In	 this	model	we	 excluded	 the	measure	 of	 current	 (at	
time	 of	 survey)	 measure	 of	 logged	 GDP,	 as	 this	 is	 highly	 correlated	 with	 past	 GDP,	 when	
respondents	where	 15	 years	 old	 (R=0.78),	which	 shows	 the	 strong	path-dependency	 in	 economic	
development.		
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negative	legacies	on	democratic	satisfaction,	especially	in	countries	at	the	mid-range	
of	economic	development,	where	governmental	actions	might	be	most	influential.		
Thirdly,	 we	 changed	 the	 sample	 that	we	 use	 in	 our	 analysis,	 by	 applying	 a	
more	restrictive	inclusion	criteria	for	cohorts	by	excluding	242	cohorts	(14	percent)	
that	have	fewer	than	50	observations.	These	relatively	empty	cells	are	more	prone	to	
outliers.	Re-running	the	analysis	of	M3,	shown	in	Table	1,	confirms	our	results	that	
the	 more	 inclusive	 autocracies	 are	 during	 respondents’	 formative	 years,	 the	 less	
positive	they	are	with	the	democratic	system	(see	Table		A11,	Model	4).		
Lastly,	we	tested	the	sensitivity	of	our	cohort	specification	by	firstly	altering	
the	 age	 at	 which	 we	 assume	 the	 formative	 years	 to	 take	 place	 and	 secondly,	
changing	the	cohort	groupings.	The	results	for	both	robustness	tests	are	presented	
in	Appendix	12.	Regarding	the	first	test,	we	estimate	models	that	match	the	regime	
ruling	strategies	when	respondents	were	1)	5-10	years	old;	2)	10-15	years	old;	3)	15-
20	years	old	(the	specification	used	for	the	main	results);	4)	20-25	years	old;	5)	25-30	
years	old;	and	6)	30-35	years	old.	It	does	not	really	matter	at	what	age	someone	is	
exposed	 to	 certain	 regime	 strategies.	 The	 results	 are	 robust	 for	 all	 different	
specification	 of	 the	 formative	 years.	 However,	 we	 decided	 to	 follow	 previous	
theoretical	and	empirical	evidence	to	determine	the	age	of	the	formative	years	to	be	
at	between	15	and	20	(Bartels	and	Jackman,	2014).	
In	 a	 second	 test	 we	 changed	 the	 cohort	 grouping	 by	 testing	 whether	 the	
results	are	sensitive	to	specifying	the	length	of	the	formative	years	as	2,	5,	8	or	10-
year	intervals	at	the	age	of	15.	This	varies	our	number	of	country-cohorts	from	3,607	
to	785.	As	 the	 results	of	Appendix	12.2	show,	our	 findings	are	not	 sensitive	 to	 the	
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cohort	 length.	For	 the	main	models	presented	above	we	however	decided	to	keep	
the	5-year	cohorts,	as	this	is	standard	in	cohort	analysis	(Fienberg	and	Mason,	1979;	
Mason	et	al.,	1973).	
Within	regime	variation	-	Winners	and	losers	of	autocracies	
After	having	established	that	authoritarian	ruling	strategies	have	a	lasting	imprint	on	
citizens’	democratic	attitudes	across	countries,	we	now	present	two	empirical	tests	
to	investigate	the	within	regime	heterogeneity	of	varying	experiences	of	people	that	
experienced	 the	 same	 ruling	 strategy.	 In	 order	 to	 test	 hypothesis	 3,	 we	 firstly	
investigate	eleven	post-Communist	countries	by	 focusing	on	the	working	class	as	a	
social	group	 that	very	much	profited	 from	the	 regime,	while	 religious	people	were	
the	 most	 suppressed	 in	 practicing	 their	 beliefs.	 Secondly,	 we	 use	 ethnic	 power	
divisions	as	another	example	of	winners	and	losers	of	dictatorships.	In	some	regimes,	
certain	ethnic	groups	are	dominant	in	holding	political	power,	while	other	groups	are	
discriminated.31			
Within-Regime	Analysis	I:	Working	Class	vs.	Religion	in	Former	Communist	Regimes	
	
Communist	 ideology	 is	 based	 on	 secularization	 and	 the	 empowerment	 of	 the	
working	 class.	 This	 creates	 clear	 winners	 –	 working	 class	 –	 and	 losers	 –	 religious	
people	 –	 of	 communist	 regimes.	 We	 test	 whether	 this	 led	 to	 varying	 levels	 of	
democratic	support	 in	 the	post-Communist	era	 in	eleven	Central	Eastern	European	
countries	 using	 the	 data	 from	 the	 European	 Social	 Survey	 (ESS)	 only.	 The	 ESS	
																																								 																				
31	The	list	of	countries	included	in	both	within-regime	analyses	is	presented	in	Appendix	13.		
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included	 in	 five	 waves	 (2004	 to	 2012)	 the	 question	 about	 the	 occupation	 of	 the	
respondent’s	 father	at	the	age	of	14.	We	thereby	contrast	those	that	come	from	a	
working	 class	 with	 the	 rest.	 The	 rationale	 of	 using	 father’s	 occupation	 is	 that	 we	
firstly	 assume	 that	 the	 social	 class	 position	 during	 the	 formative	 years	 is	 most	
important	for	crystalizing	a	sense	of	belonging	to	the	regime.	More	precisely,	people	
that	 grew	 up	 in	 a	 working	 class	 family	 are	 expected	 to	 have	 been	 socialized	 into	
belonging	to	the	selectorate	of	the	communist	regimes.	Hence,	they	are	likely	to	be	
more	critical	with	the	democratic	system	today,	as	they	might	feel	that	they	lost	out	
in	the	transition	compared	to	socialist	times.		
Secondly,	 we	 use	 father’s	 occupation	 rather	 than	 the	 respondent’s	 own	
occupation,	as	there	is	potential	social	mobility	and	we	can	hence	not	know	whether	
a	 person’s	 current	 social	 class	 corresponds	 to	 the	 social	 class	 of	 the	 time	 of	
socialization.	We	contrast	these	winners	of	socialism	with	religious	people	that	were	
very	much	repressed	by	the	state	driven	secularization	of	socialist	societies	(Mueller	
and	Neundorf,	2012).	Here	we	measure	religion	simply	by	denomination	comparing	
those	that	are	not	religious	with	those	that	are	Christians.	
The	 results	 of	 these	 analyses	 are	 reported	 in	 Table	 2.	 Here	 we	 interact	
whether	 a	 respondent	 belongs	 to	 the	 winners	 or	 losers	 with	 a	 dummy	 variable	
whether	 this	 person	 grew	 up	 during	 the	 Communist	 regime.	 The	 results	 are	
illustrated	in	Figure	6.		
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Table	2:	Linear	regression:	Satisfaction	with	democracy	(Eastern	Europe	only)	
	 M1:	Social	class	 M2:	Religion	
	 Coef.	 se	 Coef.	 se	
Age		 0.004	 (0.011)	 -0.006	 (0.008)	
	 	 	 	
Socialization	context	(at	c)	
	 	 	Autocracy	(Communism)	 -5.742***		 (0.483)	 -4.314***	 (0.389)	
Father	worker	 -4.461***		 (0.441)	
	 	Autocracy	x	father	worker	 2.353***		 (0.507)	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	Religion	(ref:	none)	
	 	 	 	Christian	 	
	
0.485	 (0.405)	
Muslim	 		
	
4.315*	 (2.229)	
Other	 		
	
0.117	 (2.794)	
Autocracy	x	
	 	 	 	Christian	 	
	
1.773***	 (0.445)	
Muslim	 		
	
2.263	 (2.477)	
Other	 		
	
1.483	 (3.365)	
	 	 	 	
Individual-level	controls	
	 	 	 	Female	 -0.540**		 (0.216)	 -0.710***	 (0.194)	
Education	(ref:	primary)	
	 	 	 	Secondary	 -2.774***		 (0.673)	 -2.391***	 (0.555)	
Post-secondary	 0.684	 (0.708)	 1.764***	 (0.594)	
Working	 0.148	 (0.251)	 0.316	 (0.225)	
Income	(ref:	bottom	20%)	
	 	 	Income:	20-40%	 2.610***		 (0.321)	 2.676***	 (0.283)	
Income:	40-60%	 4.803***		 (0.329)	 4.831***	 (0.297)	
Income:	60-80%	 4.337***		 (0.331)	 4.169***	 (0.298)	
Income:	80-100%	 2.322***		 (0.401)	 2.574***	 (0.350)	
Country	FE	(N=11)	 Yes	
	
Yes	
	Year	FE	 Yes	
	
Yes	
	Intercept	 35.218***		 (0.928)	 25.746***	 (0.904)	
N		 48,294	
	
60,139	
	R2	 0.093	
	
0.090	
	Significance:	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	P<0.01.		
Note:	The	prediction	is	based	on	a	linear	regression	with	country	FE,	controlling	for	gender,	education	
and	working.	Central	European	countries	only	(Bulgaria,	Czech	Rep.,	East	Germany,	Estonia,	Hungary,	
Latvia,	Lithuania,	Poland,	Romania,	Slovakia,	Ukraine);	Data:	ESS,	2004-2012.	
	
First	of	all,	we	see	generally	much	lower	levels	of	satisfaction	with	democracy	
for	the	generation	that	grew	up	under	communisms	contrasted	to	those	that	belong	
the	post-Communist	generation	that	grew	up	in	democratic	times.	Nevertheless,	the	
pattern	 emerging	 from	 Figure	 6	 clearly	 confirms	 Hypothesis	 3.	 Respondents	 that	
were	raised	in	a	working	class	family	are	most	critical	with	democracy	today,	while	
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those	 that	 are	 religious	 are	 significantly	 more	 satisfied	 with	 democracy.	 The	
difference	between	winners	and	losers	is	small,	but	significant.		
	
Figure	6:	Predicted	Satisfaction	with	democracy	by	social	background,	religion	and	
regime	socialization	
Note:	Predictions	and	95%	confidence	intervals	are	based	in	the	results	shown	in	Table	2.		
	
Within-Regime	Analysis	II:	Ethnic	Political	Power	Relationship			
Our	 second	 within-regime	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 ethnicity	 as	 a	 source	 for	 creating	
winners	and	losers,	 i.e.	membership	in	the	autocratic	selectorate.	For	this	purpose,	
we	rely	on	data	from	the	World	Values	Survey,	which	included	a	detailed	measure	of	
ethnicity	 as	well	 as	 the	dependent	 variable	 in	Wave	4	 (1999-2004).	We	match	 the	
ethnicity	code	of	the	WVS	to	that	of	the	data	of	Ethnic	Power	Relations	(EPR)	project	
(Vogt	et	al.,	2015).	The	EPR	provides	annual	data	(1946-2013)	on	politically	relevant	
ethnic	 groups,32	 their	 relative	 size	 as	 a	 share	 of	 the	 country	 population,	 and	 their	
																																								 																				
32	 Ethnicity	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 subjective	 experience.	 It	 is	 a	 sense	of	 commonality	 based	on	 a	 belief	 in	
common	ancestry	and	shared	culture.	Ethnic	groups	are	considered	to	be	relevant	if	either	at	least	
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access	 to	 power.	 We	 included	 in	 our	 data	 only	 the	 groups	 that	 could	 be	 clearly	
identified	 to	 avoid	 collapsing	 too	 much	 EPR	 heterogeneity	 into	 one	 category.33	
Finally,	we	have	77	ethnic	groups	from	21	countries.	In	order	to	adjust	for	sampling	
of	different	groups,	we	correct	the	results	by	using	population	weights	provided	by	
the	WVS.	
EPR	codes	the	access	to	power	of	ethnic	group	on	an	ordinal	scale,	with	three	
main	categories,	which	are	then	divided	into	sub-categories.34	Here	we	contrast	only	
two	types	of	political	power	ethnic	groups	can	have.	Firstly	a	group	can	be	dominant	
by	 ruling	 alone	 (EPR	 classification:	 monopoly	 or	 dominance)	 or	 a	 group	 can	 be	
discriminated	 by	 being	 excluded	 from	 power	 (EPR	 classification:	 powerless	 or	
discriminated).	We	do	not	count	self-exclusion	as	a	form	of	discrimination.		
Table	3	reports	the	results	of	a	linear	regression	on	satisfaction	of	democracy,	
where	 we	 identify	 whether	 a	 respondent	 belongs	 to	 an	 ethnic	 group	 that	 was	
discriminated	or	dominant	during	an	autocratic	 regime	at	 the	 time	of	 socialization	
(Model	1).	 In	Model	2	we	further	measure	the	size	of	the	discriminated	(M2a)	and	
dominant	group	 (M2b).	Again	we	 interact	 these	variables	with	 the	political	 regime	
(democratic	vs.	autocratic)	at	time	of	adolescence.	The	results	confirm	Hypothesis	2,	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
one	significant	political	actor	claims	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	group	in	the	national	political	
arena	or	if	group	members	are	systematically	and	intentionally	discriminated	in	the	political	sphere.	
33	 For	 instance,	 in	Georgia,	 EPR	 identifies	 the	 following	ethnic	 groups:	Georgians,	Armenians,	Azeri,	
Ossetians	 and	Abkhazians.	 In	 contrast,	WVS	 has	 two	 categories:	 Georgians	 and	 others.	 Then,	 the	
Georgian	ethnic	group	can	be	easily	identified	and	matched	with	the	EPR	data	on	power	relations.	
However,	the	remaining	four	ethnic	groups	cannot	be	collapsed	into	one	category	because	it	would	
mean	to	conflate	powerless	groups	(Armenian	and	Azeri)	with	self-excluded	groups	(Ossetians	and	
Abkhazians).	
34	See	Appendix	6.6	for	the	exact	classification	of	ethnic	power	position	by	the	EPR.		
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as	 people	 that	 belong	 to	 a	 discriminated	 group	 at	 time	 of	 the	 autocracy	 are	
significantly	more	positive	with	democracy	today.	
Table	3:	Linear	regression:	Satisfaction	with	democracy	and	ethnic	power	
	 M1:	Dominant	vs.	 	 Size	of	group:	
	 discriminated	 	 M2a:	Discriminated		 	 M2b:	Dominant	
	 Coef.	 s.e.	 	 Coef.	 s.e.	 	 Coef.	 s.e.	
Age	 0.046*		 (0.024)		 0.052**		 (0.023)	 	 0.041*	 (0.024)	
	 	 	 		 	 		 	
Socialization	Context	(at	c)		 	 	 		 	 		 	
Autocracy	 -0.472	 (0.900)	 	-1.164	 (0.905)	 	0.728	 (1.190)	
Discriminated	(vs.	dominant)	 1.005	 (1.269)	 		 	 	 	 	
Size	of	discriminated	group	 	 	 	 0.302	 (5.226)	 		 	
Size	of	dominant	group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.074	 (1.560)	
Autocracy	x	ethnic	group	 3.174**		 (1.456)		 20.595***		 (5.442)	 	 -0.751	 (1.733)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Individual-level	controls	 	 	 		 	 		 	
Female	 -0.567	 (0.617)	 	-0.413	 (0.603)	 	-0.612	 (0.619)	
Education	(ref:	primary)	 	 	 		 	 		 	
Secondary	 0.936	 (0.799)	 	1.631**		 (0.806)	 	 0.745	 (0.795)	
Post-Secondary	 0.922	 (0.843)	 	1.587*		 (0.852)	 	 0.631	 (0.836)	
Working	 0.469	 (0.657)	 	0.562	 (0.645)	 	0.338	 (0.659)	
	 	 	 		 	 		 	Country	FE	(N=21)	 yes		 	 yes	 	 	 yes	 	
Intercept	 34.330***		 (2.157)		 34.332***		 (2.159)	 	 34.205***	 (2.251)	
N	(of	respondents)	 13,436	 	 	 13,436	 	 	 13,436	 	
AIC		 124,599	 	 	 124,396	 	 	 124,631	 	
Significance:	 *	 p<0.1;	 **	 p<0.05;	 ***	 P<0.01.	 Data:	 WVS,	 wave	 4	 only.	 Weighted	 by	 population	
weight.		
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Figure	7:	Predicted	Satisfaction	with	Democracy	by	ethnic	power	position	and	
regime	socialization	
Note:	Predictions	and	95%	confidence	intervals	are	based	in	the	results	shown	of	Model	1	in	Table	3.		
	
These	effects	are	illustrated	in	Figures	7	and	8.	As	Figure	7	shows,	there	is	a	6	
points	 difference	 in	 democratic	 satisfaction	 between	 those	 that	 belong	 to	 the	
dominant	 group	 and	 those	 that	 belong	 to	 the	discriminated	 group.	 Turning	 to	 the	
size	of	the	ethnic	group	in	Model	2	and	Figure	8,	it	is	striking	how	strong	the	effect	is	
especially	 if	 a	 large	 group	 was	 suppressed.	 If	 a	 minority	 ethnic	 group	 ruled	 an	
autocracy	 and	 the	 discriminated	 group	 is	 in	 the	 majority,	 satisfaction	 with	
democracy	 is	much	higher.	 This	 clearly	 supports	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 a	 feeling	of	
liberation	for	such	a	discriminated	group.	
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Figure	8:	Predicted	Satisfaction	with	Democracy	by	size	of	ethnic	power	position	and	
regime	socialization	
Note:	Predictions	and	95%	confidence	intervals	are	based	in	the	results	of	Models	2a	and	2b	shown	in	
Table	3.		
Conclusion		
This	 article	 proposed	 a	 distinction	 between	 inclusionary	 and	 exclusionary	 ruling	
strategies	of	autocracies	that	cast	a	long	shadow	on	political	attitudes	even	after	the	
regime	broke	down.	We	argue	 that	 citizens’	 political	 attitudes	 towards	 democracy	
are	 shaped	 by	 the	 policies	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 regime	 in	 which	 they	 spent	 their	
formative	years.	Our	theoretical	expectations	were	that	citizens	who	were	socialized	
in	 more	 inclusionary	 regimes	 are	 more	 critical	 with	 democracy	 than	 citizens	 who	
spent	 their	 formative	 years	 in	 exclusionary	 regimes.	 The	 intuition	 behind	 this	
expectation	 was	 that	 inclusionary	 regimes	 are	 better	 at	 creating	 general	 regime	
support	 of	 citizens	 by	 a	 wider	 redistribution	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 resources.	
Further,	we	also	expected	to	observe	within	regime	differences	in	political	attitudes,	
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as	citizens	who	were	part	of	 the	winning	group	of	autocracy	are	 less	satisfied	with	
democracy	than	members	of	the	losing	group.	
	 These	expectations	were	tested	using	hierarchical	age,	period,	cohort	(HAPC)	
models	with	harmonized	public	opinion	data,	 regime	data	 from	V-Dem,	and	ethnic	
group	data	from	the	Ethnic	Power	Relations	data.	The	results	support	our	contention	
that	 people	 who	 were	 socialized	 in	 exclusionary	 regimes	 are	 more	 supportive	 of	
democracy	 compared	 to	 citizens	 socialized	 in	 inclusionary	 regimes,	 and	 even	
democracies.	 Also,	 we	 find	 that	 citizens	 that	 are	 part	 of	 the	 winning	 group	 in	 an	
autocracy	are	 less	satisfied	with	democracy	compared	to	citizens	who	were	part	of	
discriminated	groups.	We	interpret	these	democratic	attitudes	as	an	indicator	about	
the	nostalgia	for	the	old	authoritarian	regime.		
	 This	study	offered	a	micro	perspective	of	authoritarian	politics	by	examining	
the	governance	strategies	used	to	build	a	loyal	citizenry.	Further,	it	showed	the	long-
term	 effects	 of	 authoritarian	 politics	 and	 their	 legacy	 long	 after	 the	 regime	 has	
collapsed.	 These	 results	 indicate	 that	we	 should	pay	more	attention	 to	 the	 role	of	
ordinary	 citizens	 in	 autocracies	 and	 that	 political	 attitudes	 towards	 democracy	 are	
shaped	long	before	citizens	even	experience	democracy.	
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